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I. INTRODUCTION
On September 11, 2001, members of a terrorist organization killed nearly 4,000
people on American soil when they carried out deadly attacks they had planned
while some of them were living in the United States for nearly nine months and
completing their training for this mission.1
Unfortunately, the American
government, unaware of these aliens’ plan, did not have the power to deport these
known members of a terrorist organization because of their membership in that
group.2 Without evidence these aliens were planning the attacks, officials were
powerless to remove from this country these real threats to national security.
Although that Tuesday began as a typical September day, before most Americans
had poured their first cup of coffee life as we knew it changed right in front of our
very eyes. At 8:45 a.m., a commercial airliner slammed into the North Tower of the

1

Ashcroft Confirms New Terror Threat, (Nov. 27, 2001), at http://www.cnn.com/2001/US/
11/28/rec.athome.facts/index.html (last visited Nov. 28, 2001) [hereinafter Ashcroft]. This
fact sheet listed the events occurring the week of November 27th relating to the ‘War on
Terrorism’ and provided an update on the number of victims from the September 11th attacks.
While the numbers did not include the victims from the plane crash in Pennsylvania, the total
dead or missing is estimated at more than 4,000 people; see also Michael Elliot, Hate Club,
TIME MAGAZINE, Nov. 12, 2001, at 58; Michael Elliot, How the U.S. Missed the Clues, TIME
MAGAZINE, May 27, 2002, at 24.
Officials have since revised the September 11th death toll on numerous occasions, and as
of the first anniversary of the attacks, the count stands at 3,025 people killed. Eric Lipton, A
Nation Challenged: Death Toll Is Near 3,000, but Some Uncertainty Over the Count Remains,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2002, at G47.
2
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(B) (2000), amended by Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
Any alien who has engaged, is engaged, or at any time after admission engages in any terrorist
activity (as defined in section 1182 (a)(3)(B)(iii) of this title) is deportable. § 1227(a)(4)(B)
(amendments omitted to show force of statute prior to September 11th); see 8 U.S.C. § 1182
(a)(3)(B)(iii) (2000) amended by Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
‘Engage in terrorist activity’ means to commit, in an individual capacity or as a
member of an organization, an act of terrorist activity or an act which the actor knows,
or reasonably should know, affords material support to any individual, organization, or
government in conducting a terrorist activity at any time, including acts such as
gathering information on potential targets for terrorist activity, preparing or planning a
terrorist activity, providing any type of material support, soliciting of funds, and
solicitation of individuals for membership in a terrorist organization.
Id. (amendments omitted to show force of statute prior to September 11th).
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World Trade Center in New York,3 immediately engulfing the upper floors of the
building in jet-fuel fired flames. Within minutes, every news station in America
began covering what people originally believed to be a “freak accident.”4
Shortly thereafter, at 9:06 a.m., Americans would learn that this was not the
case.5 We watched on live television as a second commercial airliner barreled into
the South Tower. 6 A similar inferno ensued. At this point, it was quite obvious that
New York was under attack, and many people would die as a result.
Unfortunately, we could not imagine just how many people would be killed from
the impact of the planes and the subsequent explosions. In fact, we did not imagine
that the impact of the planes could take the towers down. But that is exactly what
happened. Once again, we watched on live television as the South Tower crumbled
to the ground.7 We gasped as the 110-story steel structure turned to dust as it
showered down on those who stood below.8 We cried as we watched terrified New
Yorkers run screaming from the debris of the falling tower.9 As if this was not
already enough death and destruction to bear, we watched the North Tower crumble
just twenty-nine minutes later.10
Once the dust began to settle, we began to comprehend that anyone remaining
inside the buildings that might have survived the impact of the airplanes, would not
have survived the disintegration of the buildings.11 Even more disheartening – we
realized that many of those left inside the now-crumbled towers were the firefighters,
policeman, and emergency medical technicians, who had rushed into the buildings to
save those injured in the initial explosions.12
We focused in silent disbelief on the unimaginable events unfolding before our
eyes, and we soon learned that another plane had crashed into the Pentagon in
Washington, D.C., and then another crashed into a rural Pennsylvania field.13 We
understood that America, not just New York, was under attack.14 We learned shortly
after the attacks that investigators determined that a group of terrorists had conducted
these deadly strikes.15
3

Nancy Gibbs, Day of Infamy, TIME MAGAZINE, Sept. 11, 2001, Special Issue, at 30.

4

Id. at 31.

5

The Today Show (NBC television broadcast, Sept. 11, 2001) [hereinafter Today Show].

6

See Gibbs, supra note 3, at 31.

7

Id. at 45.

8

Id.

9

See Today Show, supra note 5.

10

See Gibbs, supra note 3, at 45.

11

See Today Show, supra note 5.

12

See Gibbs, supra note 3, at 45.

13

Id. at 41.

14

Id. at 38.

15

Id. at 48-49. The article discusses how the passengers who made cellular phone calls
from two of the four planes before they crashed told investigators that terrorists had hijacked
the planes. The article also mentions that by the afternoon of September 11th, officials at the
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We are left full of sorrow and fear by the events of September 11th. But we are
angered by the fact that these unspeakable acts were committed not only by
terrorists, but terrorists who had entered the United States as aliens and who lived
here while plotting and training for these deadly attacks.16 We are frustrated by the
fact that under immigration and naturalization laws effective at the time of the
attacks, aliens living in the United States were not deportable for mere association17
with a known terrorist organization.18 Therefore, unless these aliens, most of whom
where known associates of their terrorist organization,19 had committed acts proving
their intent to carry out the attacks, immigration officials did not have the power to
deport them simply because of their status as members of these dangerous groups.
Immigration statutes do not specifically provide for deportation for association with
terrorist groups,20 and many recent cases involving deportation of aliens, while not
specifically addressing the constitutionality of such laws, have protected an alien’s
right to associate with a terrorist organization by narrowly construing deportation
statutes to protect the alien and allow them to remain in the country.21
In light of the devastation and destruction caused by the September 11th attacks
and the remaining imminent threat of more attacks in this country,22 this Note
National Security Agency had already intercepted electronic transmissions indicating the
terrorists involved in the attacks had ties to Osama bin Laden. Id. See Reuel Marc Gerecht,
The Future of bin Ladenism, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2002, at A21 (describing Osama bin Laden
as the leader of the terrorist group Al-Qaeda, whose mission is to make America “taste [the]
bitterness” bin Laden harbors because Islam is no longer the “glorious and militarily strong
civilization” it once used to be).
16

See Elliot, supra note 1.

17

The word “association” is defined in the context of this note as mere “affiliation” or
“membership.” “Affiliate” means to unite or associate oneself. WEBSTER’S NEW UNIVERSAL
UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 32 (2d ed. 1979). “Membership” means the state of being, or the
status as, a member (a person belonging to some association, society, community, party, etc.).
Id. at 1122-23.
18
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(B) (2000), amended by Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001);
see 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii) (2000), amended by Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272
(2001).
19

Steven Erlanger & Chris Hedges, A NATION CHALLENGED: THE TRAIL; Terror Cells
Slip Through Europe’s Grasp, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2001, at A1.
20

§ 1227(a)(4)(B).

21

Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 9 F. Supp. 2d 1176 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (finding
provisions of the federal Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) do not
criminalize mere association with designated terrorist organizations by prohibiting a United
States citizen from providing material support regardless of the donor’s intent). See also
Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 161 (1945) (Murphy, J., concurring).
22

See Ashcroft, supra note 1 (fact sheet also contained November 26th warning that
terrorists plan attack on natural gas supplies in the U.S.); see also Bush Says U.S. Needs New
Defenses (Nov. 7, 2001) at http://stacks.msnbc.com/news/639359.asp#BODY (last visited
Nov. 28, 2001) [hereinafter Bush Says]. This article about declarations made by President
Bush also discussed the statement made by Homeland Security Director Tom Ridge that
America will remain on alert indefinitely against terrorist attacks. Ridge also said individual
warnings will be issued about specific threats when credible information about such planned
attacks becomes available, such as the warnings issued on October 11th and 29th. See also
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proposes legislation that would provide for removal of aliens who are merely
associated with a known terrorist organization that has committed acts of terrorism in
the United States. Part II outlines the Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS)
legislation in effect at the time of the attacks and the rationale behind prohibiting
deportation for mere association with a known terrorist organization. Part III
discusses newly enacted legislation strengthening deportation laws, which do not go
as far as to allow for removal under the proposed circumstances. Part IV traces the
historical protection of aliens’ right to associate and examines the existence of
conflicting views about how to approach judicial review of immigration legislation.
Part V presents the argument that aliens should not be given constitutional protection
of the freedom to associate with a known terrorist organization that has acted in the
United States, and even if aliens deserve that protection, the interest of protecting
national security outweighs any constitutional issues. This section also explores and
rebuts criticism about the proposed legislation. Part VI concludes that enacting such
legislation is necessary to uphold the interest of national security in the face of
actual, imminent threats of more terrorist acts against this country.
II. INS LEGISLATION PRIOR TO SEPTEMBER 11TH ATTACKS
Current immigration and naturalization statutes do not specifically provide for
deportation of aliens for mere association with a known terrorist organization.23
Similarly, federal case law does not provide for deportation under these
circumstances.24 Many courts have deferred immigration decisions to Congress and
handled most cases dealing with such legislation by construing statutes narrowly to
protect aliens,25 rather than deciding the larger constitutional issues. Some justices
disagree with this approach and suggest that an alien’s association with any
organization should be protected by the Bill of Rights and therefore, under the First
Amendment’s Freedom of Association.26
These justices believe that the
Bill Sanderson, Stop Him: Terrorist Could Strike Today, N.Y. POST, Feb. 12, 2002, at 1
(describing latest warning that new attack could occur as early as February 12, 2002, and that
numerous other alerts have been issued to specific industries such as the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission about possible suicide airliner attacks on power plants).
23

§ 1227(a)(4)(B).

24

Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945) (reversing a judgment against an alien providing
for deportation due to Communist Party membership by narrowly defining “membership” to
find that alien did not fall within class of aliens subject to removal). The Supreme Court did
not decide the larger issue about whether such a statute violated the freedom of association
under the First Amendment. Id.
25

Katherine L. Pringle, Note, Silencing the Speech of Strangers: Constitutional Values
and the First Amendment Rights of Resident Aliens, 81 GEO. L.J. 2073, 2080 n.56 (1993)
(citing Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom
Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 564-65 (1990)).
Motomura claims courts use constitutional norms derived from areas outside of immigration to
guide immigration statute interpretation that reaches results more favorable to aliens than
those that would arise through the application of constitutional analysis giving deference to
such statutes.
26

See Michael Scaperlanda, Symposium: The Life and Jurisprudence of Justice Thurgood
Marshall: Justice Thurgood Marshall and the Legacy of Dissent in Federal Alienage Cases,
47 OKLA. L. REV. 55 (1994) (discussing Justice Thurgood Marshall’s dissents in federal
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constitutional provisions extend to all people living in the United States and do not
distinguish between citizens and aliens living in this country.27 These justices claim
that despite the fact that aliens are given no constitutional protections before they
come into the United States, once they enter and live in the country they “become
invested with the rights guaranteed by the Constitution to all people within our
borders.”28
Some justices contend that since aliens have constitutional rights, Congress does
not have the power to ignore them when exercising its “plenary power”29 of
deportation.30 These justices claim immigration statutes may not “disregard the basic
freedoms the Constitution guarantees to resident aliens.”31 As Chief Justice Murphy
stated while quoting another Justice in his concurring opinion in Bridges v. Wixon,32
The First Amendment prohibits all laws abridging freedom of press and
religion, not merely some laws or all except certain disfavored laws.33 It
would follow that the First Amendment (and other constitutional

alienage cases, in which the Justice suggested that the Bill of Rights applies to aliens and that
immigration legislation should be subject to constitutional review); see also N.A.A.C.P. v.
Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (identifying the independent constitutional right of association
under the freedom of speech enumerated in the First Amendment).
27

Bridges, 326 U.S. at 161 (Murphy, J., concurring); but see Price v. United States I.N.S.,
962 F.2d 836 (9th Cir. 1992) (recognizing Congress may limit associational rights when courts
give deference to Congress in the INS arena); Humanitarian Law Project, 9 F. Supp. 2d at
1189 (recognizing that even American citizens’ right to associate with foreign terrorist
organizations is not absolute).
28

Bridges, 326 U.S. at 161 (stating such rights include those protected by the First and the
Fifth Amendments and by the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
29

See Pringle, supra note 25, at 2078. Pringle explains that the “plenary power” of
Congress over federal immigration is derived from the belief that the federal power to regulate
aliens is inherent in the definition of national sovereignty and is therefore entrusted to the
political branches of government, and basically immune to constitutional challenge or judicial
review. Pringle quotes cases recognizing Congress’s ability to enact immigration legislation
to exclude and deport, and explains what it means to give deference to Congress’s judgment
under the plenary power.
When Congress entrusts its discretionary power over immigration to an executive
officer “he is made the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of those facts, and no
other tribunal, unless expressly authorized by law to do so, is at liberty to reexamine or
controvert the sufficiency of the evidence on which he acted.”
Id. at 2078 n.32 (quoting Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892)).
30
Bridges, 326 U.S. at 161. See also Victor C. Romero, On Elian and Aliens: A Political
Solution to the Plenary Power Problem, 4 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 343 (2000 - 2001)
(explaining that the Supreme Court has implied Congress’s plenary power over immigration
by reference to the Naturalization Clause of the Constitution and other express powers over
foreign relations and commerce).
31

Bridges, 326 U.S. at 162.

32

Id.

33

Id. (citing the dissenting opinion in Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 609 (1942)).

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol50/iss2/8

6

2002-03]

PROTECTING AMERICAN FIRST

313

amendments) make no exception in favor of deportation laws or laws
enacted pursuant to the “plenary” power of the Government.34
This recognition, that resident aliens should be given the same constitutional
guarantees in the context of immigration as citizens are given in other contexts, has
protected aliens from being deported for mere association with a known terrorist
organization.35
III. USA PATRIOT ACT OF 2001
In response to the terrorist attacks, Congress, upon the signature of President
George W. Bush, passed the Uniting and Strengthening Americas by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA
PATRIOT Act) (hereinafter the Act) on October 26, 2001.36 Congress enacted this
legislation in an effort to deter and punish terrorist acts in the United States and
around the world, to enhance law enforcement investigatory tools, and to further
numerous other purposes.37 In addition to enhancing domestic security against
terrorism, enhancing [electronic and wiretap] surveillance procedures, removing
obstacles to investigating terrorism, and providing for victims of terrorism, public
safety officers, and their families, the Act provides enhanced immigration provisions
pertaining to exclusion and deportation.38 The immigration provisions expand the
definition of a terrorist organization and the reasons that allow the government to
deport a resident alien.39 Prior to this amendment, the statute required actual
knowledge or a reason to know that the activity provided material support to an
organization planning to conduct a terrorist activity in order for deportation to arise.40
Under the USA PATRIOT Act, an alien is subject to deportation for engaging in an
enumerated terrorist activity in an individual capacity or as a member of an
organization.41 Under the Act, there is no longer a requirement that the actor knows
or reasonably should know, that the action affords material support to any individual,
organization, or government in conducting a terrorist activity at any time with
respect to the enumerated actions.42 Therefore, under the Act, an alien would be
deportable for “soliciting funds for a terrorist activity” despite lacking knowledge or

34

Id.

35

Id. However, these deportation orders have been struck down based on narrow statutory
construction rather than on a constitutional basis. See supra text accompanying note 25.
36
Uniting and Strengthening Americas by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
37

Id.

38

Id. at 272-74.

39

Id. at 347-49.

40

See 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(3)(B)(iii) (2000), amended by Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272
(2001).
41

115 Stat. at 346-47.

42
Id. See § 1182 (a)(3)(B)(iv) (prior to 2001 amendment required knowledge that the
activity provided material support to an organization planning to conduct a terrorist activity).
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having reason to know that the group is planning to commit a terrorist activity.43
Prior to the amendment, soliciting funds for a terrorist activity would subject an alien
to deportation only if the government could prove that the alien knew the group was
planning an attack and that the funds would further that attack.44
Presently, only some of the prohibited terrorist activities in the new legislation
require knowledge that the alien is engaging in terrorist activity, such as giving
material support45 to an individual who has committed or is planning to commit a
terrorist activity.46 Despite the expanded definition of terrorist activity subjecting an
alien to deportation, the new law does not provide for deportation of aliens who are
merely associated with a known terrorist organization.47
The Act is the result of two attempts by both the House and Senate to enact
antiterrorism legislation.48 The House originally passed a bill that included enhanced
provisions to strengthen immigration laws,49 as did the Senate.50 The House
leadership, rather than following the usual process for enacting legislation by
proceeding to a conference committee with the Senate to reconcile the two bills,
incorporated some of the Senate’s provisions into a second attempt at anti-terrorism
legislation with the introduction of the version of the Act as enacted.51 The House
passed this second version on October 24, 2001, and the Senate subsequently
considered and passed the bill on October 25, 2001.52
The quick passage of the second version of the Act came in response to mounting
pressure from the public, the media, and the Bush Administration to enact antiterrorism measures.53 As a result, although the bill broadens the government’s power
to conduct electronic surveillance of suspected terrorist groups and expands the
definition of terrorist activity that will subject an alien to deportation, the Act lacks
many provisions desired by Senators, Representatives, and members of the Bush
administration alike.54 While some feel the legislation does not contain strong
43

115 Stat. at 346-47.

44

§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv).

45

Id. at 347. Material support is defined as providing a safe house, transportation,
communications, funds, transfer of funds or other material financial benefit, false
documentation or identification, weapons (including chemical, biological, or radiological
weapons), explosives, or training. Id.
46

Id. at 346-47.

47

Id. at 346-49.

48

147 CONG. REC. S10,990 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy).

49

H.R. 2928, 107th Cong. (1st Sess. 2001).

50

S. 1510, 107th Cong. (1st Sess. 2001).

51

147 CONG. REC. S10,990.

52

Id.

53

147 CONG. REC. S10,990. In his address to the Senate, Senator Leahy said, “…[t]here is
no question we will vote on this piece of legislation today and we will pass this legislation
today …. The American people and the Members of this body deserve fast work and final
action.” Id.
54

Id.
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enough provisions to aid in the prevention and deterrence of terrorist acts, the
passage of the Act has concerned some legislators and commentators about the
potential infringement on the civil liberties of those at whom the bill is aimed.55 It is
possible this concern resulted in the absence of a provision expanding the reasons for
deportation to include an alien’s association with a terrorist organization that acted
here in the United States. It is the lack of such a provision that causes the Act to fall
short of this Note’s proposed expansion of immigration and naturalization law to
include deportation for association with a known terrorist organization that has
engaged in terrorist activity in America. Without this added power, the government
will be unable to effectively remove all threats to our national security.
IV. ALIENS’ RIGHT TO ASSOCIATE
A. Aliens’ Constitutional Rights, Generally
1. Fourteenth Amendment Applies to Aliens
It is well established that aliens are afforded protections under the U.S.
Constitution against state action.56 In Yick Wo v. Hopkins,57 the Supreme Court
reversed a Chinese resident alien’s conviction and imprisonment under a California
law regulating the operation of public laundries.58 The law on its face did not make a
classification between Chinese and citizen businessmen, but the law as applied
adversely affected only Chinese laundry operators.59 In invalidating the statute, the
Court determined that the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution is not limited
to the protection of citizens when a state statute is at issue.60 The Justices relied on

55
Id. The legislative history in the Congressional Record suggests that some Senators are
concerned that the new provisions expanding electronic surveillance provisions, though
admittedly needed to combat this new threat of terrorism in America, will infringe upon
Americans’ right to privacy. Id. at S11,019 (emphasis added). Wisconsin Senator Feingold
expressed concern that the burden of any infringement on civil liberties this legislation will
make will be borne primarily by immigrants from Arab, Muslim and South Asian countries.
Id. at S11,022.
56

See Scaperlanda, supra note 26, at 57-58. Scaperlanda’s article discussing Justice
Marshall’s opposition to the Supreme Court majority’s approach of giving deference to
Congress under the plenary power doctrine introduces the subject of the article by explaining
the differential treatment the Court gives to federal and state alienage legislation.
Notwithstanding some exceptions, state legislation discriminating based on alienage
classifications are often challenged under the Equal Protection clause and subject to
heightened scrutiny. As for federal legislation, the Court will apply due process analysis to
procedural measures affecting aliens. If the challenge is based on the substantive requirements
of the statute, the Court will invoke the plenary power doctrine and give deference to Congress
or the President. The statute will be subject to a less exacting standard of review.
57

118 U.S. 356 (1886).

58

Id. at 374.

59

Id. at 368.

60

Id. at 369.
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the language of the Fourteenth Amendment61 to conclude that “its equal protections
of the laws apply to all people within the United States, regardless of their race, color
or nationality.”62
The Court continues to recognize the protection of aliens by the Fourteenth
Amendment against state legislation and subjects such legislation to an Equal
Protection challenge.63 Therefore, the courts take a heightened approach to judicial
review of state legislation that applies to aliens.64 It has long been recognized that
“classifications based on alienage, like those based on race, are inherently suspect
and are therefore subject to close judicial scrutiny.”65 In reviewing such legislation,
courts use a strict scrutiny analysis.66 Under strict scrutiny, a court will look to the
substantiality of the state’s interest in enforcing the statute in question, and the
statute will only be sustained if the means are suitably tailored to serve that
compelling state interest.67 In order to survive this standard of review, states must
tailor such limitations and explore less restrictive alternatives.68
2. Governmental Function Exception to State Legislation
While Yick Wo established that the Fourteenth Amendment applies to aliens, the
courts recognize that aliens’ constitutional rights are limited in certain contexts
because of their noncitizen status.69 It is permissible for states to exclude aliens from

61

Id. It says “Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.” Id.
62

Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 369.

63
See Scaperlanda, supra note 26, at 57-58; but see David F. Levi, Note, The Equal
Treatment of Aliens: Preemption or Equal Protection, 31 STAN. L. REV. 1069 (1979)
(suggesting that the Supreme Court’s differential treatment of state and federal decisions
concerning alienage classifications are better explained in preemption rather than Equal
Protection terms).
64

Id.

65

See City of Chicago (Alvarez) v. Shalala, 189 F.3d 598, 603 (7th Cir. 1999) (using
rational basis test under plenary power doctrine to reject due process challenge to federal
welfare reform act restricting certain aliens’ eligibility for benefits). The Alvarez court did
acknowledge that in Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), the Supreme Court held that
aliens are a “discrete and insular minority” and applied a “heightened” or “close judicial
scrutiny” to the state statute at issue. Id. The court limited the Graham holding to state
legislation. Id.
66

See Pringle, supra note 25, at 2081.

67

City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (holding
invalid a city ordinance that discriminated against the mentally retarded, but declining to hold
mental retardation a quasi-suspect classification entitled to heightened review). Cleburne
included a detailed discussion about suspect classification and the appropriate standard of
review for a suspect class. Id.
68

See Levi, supra note 63, at 1076.

69

See Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978) (holding New York could bar resident aliens
from employment as state troopers under governmental function exception); see also Romero,
supra note 30, at 350 (citing Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893), in which
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such governmental positions as elected officials,70 police officers,71 and public school
teachers, provided the state has a rational basis for enacting such legislation.72 In
recognizing these limitations on aliens’ right to public employment, the Supreme
Court looks to the federal government’s ability to enact citizenship requirements
with respect to federal civil service.73 In addition, the Supreme Court has always
recognized that aliens are legitimately excluded from voting in state [and federal]
elections.74
The Supreme Court recognizes these exclusions from public employment based
upon citizenship under a “governmental function” exception to the general standard
of strict scrutiny applied to state alienage classifications.75 According to the Court,
the rationale behind allowing such classifications is an important principle inherent
in the Constitution.76
The Constitution itself refers to the distinction between citizens and aliens
no less than 11 times, which indicates that the Framers meant to give
significance in the structure of our government to the status of citizenship.
Possessing this status, whether by birth or naturalization, denotes an
association with the policy, which, in a democratic republic, exercises the
powers of governance.77 The form of this association is important: an
oath of allegiance or similar ceremony cannot substitute for the
unequivocal legal bond citizenship represents.78

the Supreme Court recognized that because “they [the Chinese plaintiffs] continue to be aliens,
they remain subject to Congress’s power to deport them, whenever it is in the government’s
judgment that removal is necessary or expedient for the public interest”). In Fong Yue Ting,
the Court upheld a Congressional statute requiring aliens of Chinese nationality to register
with the federal government or face deportation. Id.
70

Id. at 296.

71

Id. at 300.

72

Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979) (holding a state may refuse to employ aliens
who have not manifested an intent to apply for citizenship because public education
constitutes a governmental function that states can regulate, so long as there is a rational basis
for doing so).
73
Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 646 n.12 (1973) (holding unconstitutional New
York statute barring noncitizens from civil service because position did not have a rational
relation to the State’s legitimate interest). The Supreme Court did note that where citizenship
does bear a rational relation to the special demands of the particular position, such a statute
will be held constitutional. Id. at 647.
74

Id. at 648 (stating that the Supreme Court has never held that aliens have the
constitutional right to vote or hold high public office under the Equal Protection Clause).
75

Ambach, 441 U.S. at 75.

76

Id.

77

Id. at 75 (citing Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 295 (1978)).

78

Id. (citing Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 651-52 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)).
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In Ambach v. Norwick,79 the Supreme Court rejected an Equal Protection
challenge to a New York statute restricting certification as public school teachers to
any person who is not a citizen, unless that person had manifested the intent to apply
for citizenship.80 The persons challenging the constitutionality of the statute were
two resident aliens who met all the other state requirements for certification, but who
had consistently refused to seek citizenship despite their eligibility for that status.81
Upon deciding that public school education was in fact a government function, the
Court rejected the challengers’ argument based on the “principle that some functions
are so bound up with the operation of a State as a governmental entity as to permit
the exclusion from those functions those who have not become part of the process of
self-government.”82 The Supreme Court adheres to the belief that when dealing with
a state’s governmental function, the state’s concerns about its political community
are sufficient justification for classifications based on alienage if the limitation is
rationally related to that interest.83 In Ambach, the Court found the certification
restriction based on a lack of intent to obtain citizenship rational in light of the
legitimate state interests of desiring teachers who shape students perceptions, values,
and attitudes about government.84
This exception, however, is narrowly construed by the courts,85 which have held
invalid statutes preventing aliens from practicing law,86 working as an engineer,87
and receiving state educational benefits.88 Despite this limited exception to aliens’
constitutional right to obtain public employment, it is clear that aliens are granted
some Constitutional protection from adverse state action.
B. Differential Treatment of Citizens and Aliens
The governmental function exception exemplifies a willingness by the courts to
concede that there is a difference between citizens and aliens. This distinction
remains prevalent in America where aliens are governed by immigration and
naturalization statutes devoted exclusively to regulating noncitizens’ admission,
presence, and departure from this country. In fact, the INS laws provide for
differential treatment of aliens in many respects. Most notable are the consequences
for aliens convicted of crimes, which differ dramatically from those of citizens. An
79

441 U.S. 68 (1979).

80

Id. at 70.

81

Id. at 71.

82

Id. at 73-74.

83

Id. at 80.

84

Ambach, 441 U.S. at 79-81. The Ambach court added that the statute had a rational
relationship to New York’s interest because the law did not affect all aliens, only a certain
group of aliens that chose to classify themselves as aliens who prefer to retain citizenship in a
foreign country. Id. at 80-81.
85

See id. at 73.

86

Id. (citing In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973)).

87

Id. (citing Examining Board v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976)).

88

Id. (citing Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977)).
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alien who is convicted of a crime of moral turpitude within five years after admission
to the country, and is also convicted of a crime for which a sentence of one year or
longer may be imposed, is deportable upon serving his or her criminal sentence.89
Citizens, on the other hand, may remain in the country once their sentence is
complete. In fact, citizens cannot be removed from the country under the
Constitution. However, when utilizing its power over immigration, Congress
regularly makes rules for aliens that would be impermissible as against United States
citizens.90 It is in this context of immigration that the Supreme Court limits aliens’
constitutional rights and upholds deportation legislation.
C. Aliens’ Freedom of Association with Designated Terrorist Organizations
Currently, resident aliens cannot be deported under a statutory basis for
associating with designated terrorist organizations. In addition, cases overruling
aliens’ deportations for such associations have been decided by narrowly construing
the statutes at issue so the aliens’ associations did not fall within the kinds prohibited
by legislation.91 Although these cases were not decided on the larger issue of
whether prohibiting aliens’ rights to associate with terrorist organizations under the
First Amendment is unconstitutional, the effect of these holdings is to protect aliens’
associations with known terrorist organizations.
D. Plenary Power of Congress over Immigration: Federal Legislation
In the context of immigration, aliens are given constitutional protections in
regard to the procedural immigration laws,92 and Congress “must respect the
procedural safeguards of Due Process.”93 Consequently, the government is
constitutionally required prior to deportation or exclusion to give an alien notice of
the charge and a hearing to provide the alien with an opportunity to present

89

8 U.S.C. § 1227 (a)(2)(A)(i) (2000), amended by Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272
(2001). The statute also provides for deportation if an alien is, at any time after admission,
convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude arising out of more than one
scheme of criminal conduct and regardless of whether the convictions were in a single trial. §
1227 (a)(2)(A)(ii). An alien is also deportable if at any time after admission convicted of an
aggravated felony, a violation of a controlled substance law (other than a single offense
involving possession for one’s own use of a limited amount of marijuana), and certain firearm
offenses. §§ 1227 (a)(2)(A)-(C).
90
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976) (claiming Congress’s power to exclude and
deport aliens has no permissible counterpart in the federal government’s power to regulate its
own citizens).
91

Bridges, 326 U.S. at 135.

92

See Scaperlanda, supra note 26, at 57-58.

93

Price v. United States I.N.S., 962 F.2d 836, 841 n.4 (9th Cir. 1992). But see Diaz, 426
U.S. at 78-79 (recognizing that the fact aliens are protected by the Due Process Clause does
not lead to the further conclusion that all aliens are entitled to enjoy all of the advantages of
citizenship). The Diaz court went on to list federal statutes that distinguish between citizens
and aliens, and explained that Title 8 of the United States Code regulating aliens and
nationality is founded on the legitimacy of distinguishing between the two classifications. Id.
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objections.94 However, challenges regarding the substance of Congressional
decisions about exclusion, deportation, and naturalization are usually unsuccessful.95
The judiciary gives great deference to the legislature in the area of immigration
under the plenary power doctrine.96 The rationale behind this deference is based on
the reality that decisions to exclude or remove aliens must be made by Congress in
light of the changing political and economic circumstances.97 Therefore, courts will
invoke this power and uphold federal statutes when aliens challenge their
constitutionality.98 In fact, the Supreme Court has even invoked the plenary power
over immigration to limit citizen’s First Amendment Rights.99 In Kleindienst v.
Mandel,100 the Supreme Court rejected a claim by American citizens that an
exclusion provision violated their right to hear a speech conducted by a foreign
journalist who was not allowed to enter the country due to his political beliefs.101
The Court refused to weigh the strength of the government’s interests against the
rights of the citizens because the majority believed the plenary power doctrine
disposed of the need for such analysis.102 Whether the plenary power doctrine is
invoked when aliens or citizens challenge immigration statutes, the recognition of
this doctrine has given rise to the application of two different levels of judicial
review with respect to state and federal legislation.103
1. Majority Approach
It is clear that enacting immigration laws is within the plenary power of
Congress.104 In fact, the Supreme Court, for the same reasons that preclude judicial
review of political questions,105 has followed a narrow standard of review of
94

Price, 962 F.2d at 841 n.4; Rafeedie v. I.N.S., 795 F. Supp. 13, 19 (D.D.C. 1992)
(finding that withholding nature of charge from aliens in summary deportation proceedings
violates due process).
95

See Pringle, supra note 25, at 2083-84 (claiming the Supreme Court has stated that
judicial review is limited to the fairness of immigration procedures and does not extend to
substantive review of the policy choices made by the federal government).
96

Price, 962 F.2d at 840.

97

Id.

98

Diaz, 426 U.S. at 67; City of Chicago (Alvarez) v. Shalala, 189 F.3d 598 (7th Cir. 1999)
(invoking the plenary power to reject under rational basis review a challenge to certain
provisions of the Welfare Reform Act restricting certain aliens’ eligibility for benefits, despite
challenger’s assertion that the plenary power doctrine only applies to immigration legislation
such as deportation measures, rather than welfare legislation that has an impact on aliens).
99

Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952).

100

408 U.S. 753 (1972).

101

Id. at 759.

102

Id. at 765.

103

See Pringle, supra note 25.

104

See Romero, supra note 30, at 350.

105

See Pringle, supra note 25, at 2093 n.146. Pringle explains that deference given to
immigration legislation under the plenary power doctrine is compared to the doctrine of
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Congressional and Presidential decisions about immigration and naturalization.106 In
following this view, courts have reasoned that although aliens are given
constitutional rights regarding non-immigration matters, those rights are limited by
the plenary power of Congress over immigration when it comes to deportation.107 In
support of this argument, many cases hold that such deference dictates “a narrow
standard of review of immigration.”108 This deferential standard of review is the
rational basis test.109 Under this test, a federal statute’s constitutionality will be
upheld if there is a rational relationship between the interest Congress seeks to
protect and the measure taken to protect that interest.110 This means that a statute
will not be held in violation of the Constitution unless the means used to further the
interest Congress seeks to protect are irrational or that the state’s interest itself is not
legitimate.111 Congress does not need to produce evidence or statistics to “sustain the
rationality of a statutory classification” and instead can base its legislation on

political questions, in which certain issues of foreign affairs are not reviewable by the courts.
She references:
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962), in which the Supreme Court labeled
questions of foreign affairs as political questions because they turn on standards that
defy judicial application and because in issues of foreign affairs, the government must
speak with one voice. The Baker court however, affirmed that questions involving
foreign affairs are not categorically removed from review, but should only be
considered political questions if, after “discriminating analysis,” a question is found to
be inappropriate for judicial handling.
Id. at 2093 n.146.
106
Price v. United States I.N.S., 962 F.2d 836, 841 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that the
Supreme Court has given this deference on the basis that such decisions implicate foreign
relations and, “since a wide variety of classifications must be defined in the light of changing
political and economic circumstances,” such decisions are often more appropriately made by
Congress or the Executive rather than the Judiciary) (emphasis added).
107

See Romero, supra note 30, at 350.

108

Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998) (striking down an Equal Protection challenge to
an immigration statute on theory that immigration policy is subject to the plenary power of
Congress). See also A.A.D.C. v. Reno, 525 U.S. 471 (1999) (stating the judiciary should
otherwise defer to Congress’s expertise in immigration matters, even if an analogous
prosecution of citizens based on their group affiliations would raise a valid constitutional
claim); Romero, supra note 30, at 357 (suggesting decision in Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S.
21 (1982), illustrates the Supreme Court’s reluctance to completely protect aliens’ rights even
in the face of a rather sympathetic plaintiff). But see Scaperlanda, supra note 26, at 63
(discussing Justice Marshall’s view as expressed in his dissenting opinion in Fiallo v. Bell,
430 U.S. 787, 805 (1977), that deferential review under the plenary power doctrine is
“toothless” and amounts to “abdication”). “Abdication” is the [Court’s] abandonment of its
[judicial] responsibility. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1 (Pocket Ed. 1996).
109
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976) (giving deference to Congress in immigration
arena and upholding Social Security provision providing certain Medicare benefits to citizens
but excluding certain aliens).
110

Id. at 85.

111

See Pringle, supra note 25, at 2082.
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“rational speculation.”112 Some courts have described this as “any reasonably
conceivable state of facts will suffice to satisfy rational basis scrutiny.”113
2. Suggested Approach
The immigration cases upholding deportation and exclusion provisions under the
plenary power doctrine have not been decided without opposition. While agreeing
with the ultimate outcome of upholding such provisions, some Justices have
explained in their concurring and dissenting opinions that they reached their decision
using a heightened level of scrutiny, which they claim must be applied when
immigration laws implicate Constitutional rights of aliens.114 Dissenting Justices
have argued that Constitutional restraints impose restrictions on the federal
government’s exercise of its immigration power.115 Such limitations on the plenary
power over immigration would lead to the more exacting strict scrutiny that is
applied against the states.116
In his concurring opinion in Bridges v. Wixon,117 Justice Murphy discussed the
unconstitutionality of a statute providing for deportation of aliens who are members
of, or affiliated with, any organization that believes in the forceful overthrow of the
government of the United States.118 While the majority opinion held an alien’s
detention pursuant to a deportation statute unlawful by narrowly construing the
statute, rather than deciding the case using a constitutional analysis, the concurrence
of Justice Murphy dove into the larger issue of whether such a statute was
constitutional.119 In deciding the statute was unconstitutional, Justice Murphy
claimed allowing deportation under the law would amount to guilt by association, a
principle disallowed under the Bill of Rights as against aliens and citizens alike.120
112

Lewis v. Thompson, 252 F.3d 567, 582 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S.
312, 320 (1993), quoting FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993))
(using rational basis test to sustain a provision of a federal welfare statute and reverse an
injunction requiring the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services to provide
Medicaid prenatal care to an illegal alien pregnant woman). See also Scaperlanda, supra note
26, at 57 (claiming deferential review of federal alienage cases lurks somewhere between a
rational basis review and no review at all).
113

Lewis, 252 F.3d at 582 (quoting Beach Communications, 508 U.S. at 313).

114

See Scaperlanda, supra note 26, at 60-62 (stating that Justice Marshall claimed in his
dissenting opinion in Kleindeinst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972), that he would have
applied heightened scrutiny and struck down a law excluding a Marxist scholar from the
United States because the government failed to meets its burden by showing it had a
compelling interest for enacting the statute).
115

Id.

116

Id.

117

326 U.S. 135, 161 (1945).

118

Id. at 157.

119

Id. at 157. The majority opinion decided the deportation provision was unlawful due to
a misconstruction of the statute’s terms, rather than deciding the larger issue of whether such a
provision violated an alien’s right to associate under the First Amendment. Id.
120

Id. at 163.
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Justice Murphy argued that the Constitution protects aliens living within our borders
in the exercise of “the great individual rights necessary to a sound political and
economic democracy;” therefore, the right of aliens should be weighed against any
purported governmental interest.121 If a court were to apply Justice Murphy’s
approach to immigration legislation, a strict scrutiny level of review would be used.
Justice Marshall, in his dissenting opinion in Kleindeinst v. Mandel,122 disagreed
with the majority of the Supreme Court’s approach of using an “unusual” standard of
a “facially legitimate and bona fide reason” to find that an immigration provision
excluding aliens based on their political associations did not violate the First
Amendment.123 Justice Marshall claimed that when the First Amendment freedom of
association is implicated, the government’s rationale must survive a heightened
standard of review.124 “It is established constitutional doctrine, after all, that the
government may restrict First Amendment rights only if the restriction is necessary
to further a compelling governmental interest.”125 According to the dissenting
Justice’s opinion, the government had not made such a showing here.126
E. Limits on Citizens’ Rights to Associate with Foreign Organizations
Americans’ rights to associate with foreign organizations are limited.127 In
Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno,128 the United States District Court of the Central
District of California held that a provision in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act criminalizing support by American citizens to designated terrorist
organizations was not in violation of their right to associate under the First
121

Id. at 166.

122

408 U.S. 753, 774 (1972).

123

Id. at 777.

124

Id.

125

Id.

126

Id. at 779-80. Justice Marshall admits that the government can use its immigration
power to regulate aliens when the government has a compelling interest, such as actual threats
to national security and genuine requirements of law enforcement. Id. at 783-84. In fact,
Marshall claims these interests are “surely compelling.” Id. (emphasis added). These
statements suggest that Justice Marshall might have supported taking a deferential approach to
immigration legislation in the context of the modern world in which terrorism poses a real and
significant threat to national security. Even if this assumption is incorrect, the “surely”
compelling interest of actual threats to national security would, as according to Justice
Marshall, survive strict scrutiny review.
127

See Humanitarian Law Project, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 1190 (citing DKT Memorial Fund, Ltd.
v. Agency for Int’l Dev., 887 F.2d 295 (D.C. Cir. 1989)). See also N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama,
357 U.S. 449 (1958) (recognizing the independent constitutional right of association under the
freedom of speech enumerated in the First Amendment, while distinguishing that case from
others in which the Supreme Court upheld governmental regulation that abridged the freedom
of association because of the particular violent character of the groups in question and the
reasons advanced by the government were constitutionally sufficient to justify infringement on
that right). The N.A.A.C.P. court found Alabama fell short of showing a compelling interest
to justify infringement on the [citizens’] right to associate. Id. at 466.
128

Humanitarian Law Project, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 1190.
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Amendment.129 The court, in applying a strict scrutiny test because the legislation
implicated the right to associate, found the government’s interest in national security
a compelling interest that permits the imposition on citizens’ ability to maintain
associations with foreign organizations.130 Although a heightened level of scrutiny
will be applied where First Amendment rights are implicated, the fact remains that
Congress can limit that right where national security is at issue.
V. IMMIGRATION LAWS SHOULD PROVIDE FOR DEPORTATION OF ALIENS
FOR MERE ASSOCIATION WITH TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS THAT HAVE
ACTED IN THE UNITED STATES
Terrorism poses a real and imminent threat to United States citizens,131 both
abroad and, as proven on September 11th, here in America. Although the
government is limited by outside forces as to what steps it can take to prevent the
occurrence of terrorist acts against Americans abroad, it has the power to act as
stringently as possible to keep its citizens safe at home.132 In order to ensure
prevention of another terrorist attack on our soil, the government must be able to
exercise its deportation power to remove all alien members of a terrorist organization
that has acted in the United States. Without that ability, the government will be
powerless to remove an alien it knows to be a member of a terrorist organization but
has not yet engaged, or cannot prove has engaged, in the unlawful activity beyond
membership that is currently required for deportation. If government officials had
that power prior to the September 11th attacks, they could have removed the aliens
who were silently planning the attacks while living among our citizens,133 which
might have enabled officials to help prevent the deadly events of that terrible day.
A. Aliens Do Not Deserve Constitutional Protection to Associate with Terrorist
Organizations that Have Committed Terrorism In America
1. Plenary Power of Congress
Congress has the plenary power to enact immigration legislation it deems
necessary to protect the interest of national security.134 The fact that a terrorist
organization acted within the United States135 and the credible evidence that the
group plans future attacks136 proves that national security is at risk. The recent
acknowledgement by government officials that there are “sleeper cells” hiding in
America waiting to launch another attack that could possibly be more devastating

129

Id.

130

Id. at 1192.

131

See Ashcroft, supra note 1. See supra note 22, and accompanying text.

132

See supra notes 29, 30 and accompanying text.

133

Steven Mufson, The Way Bush Sees the World, THE WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 17, 2002,

at B1.
134

See supra notes 29, 30 and accompanying text.

135

See Gibbs, supra note 3, at 48-49.

136

See Bush Says, supra note 22.
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than the September 11th attacks,137 is even greater evidence of the imminent threat to
national security. With America facing such grave danger, Congress must be able to
exercise its legislative power and enact restrictions on aliens’ rights to freely
associate with a known terrorist organization that has committed terrorism here in
America in an effort to protect national security.
Under the plenary power doctrine, courts give great deference to Congress and
uphold such legislation as long as there is a rational relationship between the interest
Congress seeks to protect and the measure taken to protect that interest.138 Under this
doctrine, an immigration statute providing for deportation of aliens who are
associated with terrorist organizations would pass the rational basis test. It is rational
to believe that Congress can better protect national security by removing aliens for
mere association with terrorist organizations, rather than waiting until the
government can prove an intent to engage in terrorist activity before the power to
deport arises. Waiting until that point is often too late. As we learned shortly after
the September 11th attacks, the aliens who carried out the attacks lived in our society
and carried on like regular citizens, often frequenting typical “American” venues
such as bars and strip clubs.139 Meanwhile, these aliens were taking lessons at flight
schools with the intent to use these acquired skills to steer planes into buildings.140
This outward behavior was nothing more than lawful, and without proof of their
intent to carry out attacks on Americans and their government, immigration laws
were powerless to remove these aliens from our country.
Many of the nineteen alien attackers were known members of their terrorist
organization.141 Under the proposed legislation, government officials could have
removed these aliens from the United States before they executed their plan or
exhibited the intent to carry out a terrorist act. It is rational to take the measure of
prohibiting alien association with terrorist groups acting in the United States since it
could in fact prevent the occurrence of the very terrorist acts that threaten this
country’s security. Since the means taken to protect the government interest is not
irrational, such a statute would not be held in violation of the Constitution.142
Therefore, if Congress, in the face of imminent danger, exercises its plenary power
over immigration and allows for removal of aliens for mere association with such
groups to protect the interest of national security, such a statute would be justified
under the rational basis test.

137

Philip Shenon & James Risen, A Nation Challenged: Bin Laden’s Network; Al Qaeda
Leader Is Reported to Plan New Raids on U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2002, at A1.
138

Diaz, 426 U.S. at 83.

139

James Risen & David Johnson, A Nation Challenged: The Investigation; Authorities
Seek Man In Organizing of Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2001, at B1.
140
Clyde Haberman, A Nation Challenged: An Overview: Nov. 28, 2001; Troop Buildup,
an Aggressive Dragnet and the High Price of Terror, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2001, at B1.
141

Judith Miller, A Nation Challenged: The Response; Planning for Terror but Failing to
Act, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2001, at 1A1.
142

See Pringle, supra note 25, at 2082.
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2. Similar Justification to the “Governmental Function” Exception
Although deference to immigration legislation is usually only given to the federal
government, under the governmental function exception, state laws based on
citizenship that ordinarily would be held unconstitutional are subject to minimal
judicial review.143 In allowing states to exclude aliens from employment in certain
occupations, the Supreme Court justifies such classifications based on the
significance of the status of citizenship.144
It is this status of citizenship that justifies the proposed legislation. Citizenship is
a form of association with the policy of the United States,145 and in times where
national security is seriously threatened, a policy ridding those aliens whose
membership ties suggest anti-American-policy sentiments is equally as justified as
an exclusion from public employment. It is possible some critics might argue that
restricting aliens’ employment opportunities is not as extreme as removing them
from the country. While that is true, the interest protected by limiting employment
eligibility is not as extreme a threat as further terrorist attacks in this country. If the
proposed legislation were viewed in these terms, the rationale behind the
governmental function exception to strict scrutiny review of legislation affecting
aliens would support a similar lower standard of judicial review for legislation
prohibiting aliens’ association with known terrorist organizations when national
security is at risk. Under this lower standard of review, such a provision would be
subject to the rational basis test, which would be passed.146
3. Differential Treatment of Aliens and Citizens
Some critics of the proposed legislation might question why alien associates of
known terrorist organizations are any more of a threat to national security than
citizen members of the same groups. The proposed legislation does not assert this.
It is possible that a citizen member of such a group is equally as dangerous.147
However, aliens and citizens have long been treated differently when it comes to
unlawful behavior, as evidenced by Congress’s power to deport aliens who have
been convicted of certain crimes.148 While a citizen would not be subject to
deportation, they would be subject to other punishment for activity that threatened
national security.149 This difference in treatment recognizes that aliens and citizens

143

See supra Part IV.A.2.

144

Id.

145

Ambach, 441 U.S. at 75 (citing Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291,295 (1978)). The
Ambach court explained that the assumption of the status of citizenship, whether by birth or
naturalization, denotes an association with the policy of the American government. Id.
146

See supra Part IV.D.1.a.

147

If not even more dangerous because of the greater constitutional protections afforded to
citizens.
148

See supra Part IV.B.

149

See e.g., Espionage Act of 1917, 18 U.S.C. § 794 (2003) (subjecting citizens convicted
of committing espionage against the United States to imprisonment for any term of years or
for life, and in certain extreme cases, imposition of the death penalty).
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are not given the same constitutional protections, especially where immigration
legislation is involved.
B. Interest of National Security Outweighs Aliens’ Right to Associate
with Terrorist Organizations
It is undeniable that national security is at risk.150 Government officials have
received credible information that more attacks in the United States are planned, and
that some of the potential attackers could likely to be residing in the country.151 With
these facts illustrating the seriousness of the current state of American affairs,
Congress, along with many other government officials, needs to be able to do
everything in its power to prevent these planned attacks from occurring.
1. National Security Is a Compelling Governmental Interest
If, for the sake of argument, the plenary power doctrine would not protect
Congress from heightened judicial scrutiny of a deportation law prohibiting aliens’
associations with terrorist organizations that have acted here in America, then such
legislation would be subject to strict scrutiny review. Under this heightened
standard, a statute will be held unconstitutional if the means used are not narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling state interest.152
Legislation allowing deportation for mere association with a known terrorist
group is constitutional under the strict scrutiny test. Courts have undoubtedly held
that the government’s interest in national security is a substantial one.153 If Congress
determines that abridging aliens’ freedom of association is the only effective way to
enable the government to root out terrorists before they act in a manner signifying
intent to commit terrorist activities and jeopardizing national security, then the strict
scrutiny test would be satisfied if the statute is narrowly tailored. Congress must
show that there are no less restrictive means to achieve its goal of protecting the
country from future attacks by terror groups that plan to strike. Congress could make
such a showing that future attacks could be prevented by deporting alien members of
these organizations, since they “camouflage” into American society without
engaging in behavior other than their affiliation that would alert officials to another
act of terrorism.154 Assuming such a showing could be made, this showing coupled
with the sufficiently important interest of national security in the face of actual
threats of additional terrorist attacks on United States soil, would enable the
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See supra text accompanying note 22.
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See Erlanger & Hedges, supra note 19.

152

City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
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Humanitarian Law Project, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 1193. See also Justice Marshall’s dissent
in Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 783-84 (1972) (claiming that although the
government made no such showing here, an actual threat to national security is surely a
compelling governmental interest sufficient to restrict First Amendment rights).
154

See Erlanger & Hedges, supra note 19 (discussing how many terrorists slipped into the
United States and adopted deceptive outward habits of the West such as drinking and dating to
mask their activities). Erlanger and Hedges also assert that the nature of sleeper cells,
integrating into mainstream society, makes it hard to know when more attacks will occur. Id.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2002

21

328

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:307

proposed statute to survive a constitutional challenge under a heightened level of
review. Even Justice Marshall admitted this in his Kleindeinst dissent.155
2. Rationales Behind Suggested Approach to Immigration Laws Are
No Longer Valid in Modern World
Historically, many judges in federal alienage cases argued that aliens should
enjoy protection of the freedom of association under the First Amendment and that
the plenary power doctrinal approach to immigration legislation be abandoned.156 If
these justices are correct, then Congress cannot ignore constitutional rights of aliens
in exercising its plenary power, and a heightened scrutiny standard of review should
apply.157 Even though the proposed legislation would pass a heightened scrutiny
test,158 it is necessary to examine why the arguments advanced by these justices are
no longer relevant in today’s world.
The opinions discussing this alternative approach to federal alienage legislation
are largely based on assumptions that no longer exist in the modern world in which
terrorism exists and which presents a real danger to Americans not just abroad, but
here at home. For example, Justice Murphy’s concurring opinion in Bridges v.
Wixon,159 claimed the Constitution gives aliens protection “in the exercise of the
great individual rights necessary to a sound political and economic democracy.”160
Justice Murphy’s rationale for protecting aliens’ constitutional rights has limited
significance in the current context where the goals of the terrorist organization that
acted on September 11th are aimed at disturbing our sound political and economic
democracy.161 In fact, the personal, political, and economic destruction caused by
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Kleindeinst, 408 U.S. at 783-84.
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See supra Part IV.D.1.b.
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Id.
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See supra Part V.B.1.
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326 U.S. 135, 161 (1945).
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Id. at 166.
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See Gibbs, supra note 3, at 33, 41. Gibbs wrote, “We couldn’t move – that must have
been the idea.” Gibbs added, “Having hit the country’s financial and cultural heart, the killers
went for its political and military muscle.” Id. See also Lisa Beyer, Roots of Rage, TIME
MAGAZINE, Oct. 1, 2001, at 44. This article discusses how bin Laden and his followers’ hatred
toward America leads them to focus on killing large numbers of Americans.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol50/iss2/8

22

2002-03]

PROTECTING AMERICAN FIRST

329

terrorists on September 11th,162 and the threat of future attacks,163 did exactly that:
disrupted our sound political and economic democracy.164
Protecting the rights of aliens to associate with terrorist organizations that have
committed terrorism in America will enable these groups to further their goals of
disrupting the democracy that Justice Murphy was concerned about.165 If the
government does not have the power to deport aliens it knows to be members of such
a terrorist organization and can not prove anything beyond association,166 the
government will be powerless to protect the political and economic climates and the
safety of Americans. In light of the changing world in which the threat of terrorism
is a reality, the same rationale that Justice Murphy advanced to support protecting an
alien’s right to associate should now be used to limit that right in relation to terrorist
organizations in order to protect democracy within the United States.
3. Citizens’ Right to Associate with Foreign Organizations Is Limited
In recognizing the government’s interest in national security, courts have
imposed restrictions on a citizen’s right to associate with foreign groups.167 It
follows that in the interest of national security, the government could be compelled
to restrict an alien’s right to associate with a terrorist organization that has committed
deadly acts of violence in our country. In fact, the government may impose
limitations or regulations on “free association conducted for an illegitimate
purpose.”168 Since terrorist organizations by definition have the illegitimate purpose
of engaging in terrorist activity,169 Congress would be allowed to prohibit aliens’
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Bill Powell, Economy Under Siege, FORTUNE MAGAZINE, Oct. 15, 2001, at 88. Powell
explains that when Wall Street re-opened the Monday after the attacks, the stock market
suffered its worst one-week loss since the Great Depression. See also Noam Neusner, Is It
Really That Bad? Welcome to the Fear Recession, Where People With Money Won’t Spend It,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Nov. 19, 2001, at 36. Neusner claims economists believed the
economy was ready to recover prior to the attacks, but since September 11th, the key
economic indicators such as the unemployment rate, productivity, and retail sales have
declined.
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See Ashcroft, supra note 1. See also Bush Says, supra note 22.

164

See supra text accompanying note 162.
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See Powell, supra note 162, at 91. Powell stated that “two weeks after the September
11th, attacks, the still-burning World Trade Center ruins reminds Americans of our new world
that is economically and politically unrecognizable.” Id.
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While it is argued that mere membership without the intent to act illegally does not
further terrorist groups’ goals, protecting aliens’ membership in such groups provides “moral
support” that legitimizes the beliefs of these groups.
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Humanitarian Law Project, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 1193.
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Id. at 1186 (citing Palestine Information Office v. Shultz, 853 F.2d 932, 941 (D.C.Cir.
1988)).
169

8 U.S.C. § 1189 (a)(1) (2000), amended by Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
In general, the Secretary is authorized to designate an organization as a foreign
terrorist organization in accordance with this subsection if the Secretary finds that: (A)
the organization is a foreign organization; (B) the organization engages in terrorist
activity (as defined in section 1182(a)(3)(B) of this title); and (C) the terrorist activity
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association with such groups in the interest of national security. Even if aliens
should be given the same constitutional rights as citizens, it should not follow that
they should be given greater protection than Americans. If it is constitutional to limit
a citizen’s right to associate with certain organizations, then it is constitutional to
limit an alien’s right to associate with a terrorist organization in light of the special
characteristics of an environment in which terrorists have acted in the United States,
and the threat of future attacks is real.
C. Response to Criticism About the Proposed Legislation
Some activists are concerned that any legislative response to combating terrorism
in the United States will sacrifice the civil rights of aliens. These activists have
expressed concern about the loss of aliens’ political freedom and equal treatment,
and have urged that those liberties should not be traded to protect national security.170
During testimony given to a subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee,
Georgetown University Law Center Professor David Cole claims:
[T]he [then proposed] Patriot Act gives Immigration and Naturalization
officials the power to impose ‘guilt by association,’ for any alien’s
support of any group designated as a foreign terrorist organization by the
Secretary of State.171 Imposing guilt by association is a concept that the
Supreme Court in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.172 rejected as “alien
to the traditions of a free society and the First Amendment itself.173
Pofessor Cole further claims that Congress repudiated guilt by association
altogether in 1990, when it repealed the McCarran-Walter Act174 provisions of the
Immigration and Naturalization Act, which made association with the Communist
Party a deportable offense.175 Professor Cole likens the McCarran-Walter Act to
proposed legislation, which he claims would in effect make an alien deportable for
mere association with a terrorist organization. He concludes that such legislation
would be in violation of the First Amendment of the Constitution.176

of the organization threatens the security of United States nationals or the national
security of the United States.
Id. (amendments not included because do not change meaning of statute).
170
USA PATRIOT Act of 2001: Hearing on S. 1510 Before the Subcommittee on the
Constitution, Federalism and Property Rights of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 107th Cong.
(2001) (testimony of David Cole, Professor, Georgetown University Law Center) [hereinafter
Patriot Act Hearing].
171

Id. See also 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (a)(1).

172

458 U.S. 886, 932 (1982) (holding a state may not impose liability for the consequences
of the nonviolent elements of the petitioners’ boycott activities, which were entitled to First
Amendment protection) (emphasis added).
173

See Patriot Act Hearing, supra note 170.
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8 U.S.C. § 1251 (1988), amended by Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-589 (1996)
and transferred to 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (a)(4)(B).
175

See Patriot Act Hearing, supra note 170.
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Id.
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Cole also asserts that “freedom and security need not necessarily be traded off
against one another; maintaining our freedoms is itself critical to maintaining our
security.”177 To prove his assertion, Cole cites United States v. Robel,178 in which the
Supreme Court declared invalid a provision of the Subversive Activities Control Act
of 1950, denying employment in any defense facility to members of the Communist
Party because the law violated an alien’s freedom to associate under the First
Amendment.179 In the words of the deciding Justices, “[I]t would indeed be ironic if,
in the name of national defense, we would sanction the subversion of one of those
liberties - the freedom of association - which makes the defense of the Nation
worthwhile.”180
The arguments of civil rights activists such as Professor Cole assume that aliens
are undoubtedly given the same constitutional rights as American citizens. In
response to the contention that such legislation is in violation of the First
Amendment freedom of association, that argument assumes federal case law
unequivocally provides that right to aliens.181 Professor Cole refers to Robel to claim
that it does; however, at issue in that case was whether the government could limit an
alien’s First Amendment rights under its war powers, not whether the government
can limit aliens’ constitutional rights under its plenary immigration power.182 Robel,
therefore, is not controlling authority to the immigration issue.
When Congress exercises its plenary power, the Supreme Court has historically
given the government great deference to its decisions about immigration and
naturalization.183 The Court will uphold immigration legislation that implicates
aliens’ constitutional rights if the government has a rational basis for enacting such
laws.184 It is, therefore, likely that the courts would uphold anti-terrorist legislation
that limits First Amendment rights in the context of deportation if Congress were so
inclined to legislate for the rational reason of removing alien members of a terrorist
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Id.
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389 U.S. 258, 264 (1967).

179

Id. at 268.

180

See Patriot Act Hearing, supra note 170.

181

See United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 267-68 (1967) (recognizing that in striking
down on First Amendment grounds the Anti-Communist law at issue, the Court will not strike
down all legislation placing a substantial burden on protected activities, so long as Congress
achieves its goal by means which have a ‘less drastic’ impact on the First Amendment
freedoms). The Supreme Court in Robel in effect created a heightened scrutiny standard of
review for legislation impacting aliens’ First Amendment rights. If Professor Cole’s assertion
is correct that Robel is controlling, then this heightened standard would apply to the proposed
legislation. Even if that is so, the legislation would pass under that test. See supra Part V.B.1.
182

Robel, 389 U.S. at 263-64.

183

Price, 962 F.2d 836 (citing numerous cases to prove statement that it has long been
recognized that resident aliens enjoy the protections of the First Amendment, however, the
protection afforded may be limited).
184

Id. at 841.
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group threatening to commit further acts of terrorism in the United States, which
presents an actual threat to national security.185
VI. CONCLUSION
The world as Americans knew it changed the morning of September 11th, when
we learned that terrorism had come to our country after nineteen resident aliens
hijacked four commercial airliners with plans to crash them into significant
American targets.186 Once these aliens took control of the planes, they used them as
weapons of mass destruction and killed more than 4,000 people in New York City,
Washington, D.C., and rural Pennsylvania.187 The terrorists plotted these attacks for
nine months, while living in the United States under resident alien status.188 Under
immigration laws available at that time, these aliens were not deportable for mere
association with their terrorist organization.189 Law enforcement officials did not
[and still do not] have the power to deport aliens for such association. Until the
government can prove a resident alien has intent to conduct a terrorist activity,
officials are restrained from exercising their deportation power.190 In light of the
changing world in which terrorism poses an imminent threat here in America, aliens’
freedom to associate with terrorist organizations that have committed terrorism in the
United States should not be protected under the Constitution.
Congress has the plenary power to enact immigration legislation and limit aliens’
rights when it has a rational basis for this action.191 There is no more rational reason
for limiting a resident alien’s First Amendment right to associate than national
security in the current situation, in which the threat of more attacks makes
Americans vulnerable to more death and destruction in the United States. Even if the
plenary power doctrine would not support such legislation under a rational basis test,
Congress still has the power to enact such legislation if it has compelling interest.192
There is no more compelling interest than that of protecting the security of the
United States by attempting to prevent more attacks, when there have been actual
threats made that more violence is being planned. In order to effectively protect
national security, the government must have the power to remove aliens for mere
association with these groups, rather than waiting until these aliens’ actions above
and beyond mere membership signify the intent to further terrorism.
The courts have historically placed a value on citizenship, and in doing so have
upheld State public employment statutes distinguishing between aliens and citizens
in the public employment context.193 This recognition of a distinction based on
185

See supra Part V.B.1.
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Johanna McGeary & David Van Biema, Inside the Conspiracy: The New Breed of
Terrorist, TIME MAGAZINE, Sept. 24, 2001, at 28.
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Id. at 31.
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8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(B) (2000), amended by Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
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191

See supra Part IV.D.

192

See supra Part IV.D.1.b.
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citizenship is even more evident in the treatment of criminal aliens. This class of
aliens is subject to deportation upon completion of their criminal sentences; a
consequence not similarly shared by citizens who are protected under the
Constitution from such treatment. These rules illustrate Congress’s power to
regulate aliens in ways that would be unconstitutional as applied against citizens.
In addition, the rationale behind upholding an alien’s right to associate under the
constitution is no longer relevant in the context of a world in which terrorism exists
and remains an imminent threat. Justices advancing the belief that aliens should be
given constitutional protection did so under the premise that we need to uphold our
sound political and economic democracy.194 Under that approach, the recent change
in America’s economic and political climates requires limiting that right to protect
national security.
Other Justices advancing the belief that aliens should be given constitutional
protections recognize that those protections can be limited when the government can
show a compelling governmental interest.195 Justice Marshall admitted that actual
threats to national security are “surely” the kinds of compelling governmental
interests that would survive strict scrutiny review of legislation infringing on aliens’
constitutional rights.196 Since the government has received actual threats of more
attacks, it has a compelling interest to deport aliens who are associated with a
terrorist organization that has acted in the United States.
Equally important is that protecting association with such organizations would
give aliens greater rights than those given to American citizens, whose freedom to
associate with foreign organizations is limited under special circumstances.197
Considering the “special circumstances” in which the threat of more attacks is real,
aliens should not be given the right to associate with designated terrorist
organizations and should be subject to deportation for such activity. In fact, in
recognizing citizens’ independent right to associate under the freedom of speech
enumerated in the First Amendment, the Supreme Court noted that it had limited the
right to associate where the government had a substantial interest for doing so and
the particular nature of the group in question was one of violence.198 If the Supreme
Court is willing to limit a citizen’s right to associate with a violent group when the
government has a substantial interest, then the Court would certainly limit an alien’s
right to associate with a violent terrorist group when the government has a
substantial interest in protecting the country from further attacks.
It is clear that aliens’ constitutional rights are not absolute. Whether immigration
legislation providing for deportation for mere association with a known terrorist
organization that has committed terrorism in the United States would be subject to a
narrow standard of review under the government’s plenary power, or whether subject
to strict scrutiny, such legislation would pass constitutional muster under either test.
By withstanding these levels of scrutiny, such legislation, if enacted, is within the
realm of Congress’s legislative authority.
194

Bridges, 326 U.S. at 161 (Murphy, J., concurring).
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The government needs to exercise its ability to deport alien members of
designated terrorist organizations acting in America and threatening to strike again to
adequately protect national security. Without this power, alien members of terrorist
groups can continue to reside in the United States while waiting to execute more
attacks that government officials warn are being planned. Before September 11th,
the government did not have this ability to help prevent the attacks. If the
government been able to deport the aliens for their association with a known terrorist
organization, officials could have removed them from the country before they had
the opportunity to carry out their terrorist plan. The government must be able to
exercise this kind of power so that September 11th will be the worst day in history
that Americans should ever have to remember.
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